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court proceedings, with the exception of Tel Tech, Inc.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT E. CONGER,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 890231-CA

vs.
TEL TECH, INC.,
Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Rules 3, 4
and 4A of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Rule 4A of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals.

Mr. Conger appeals from the Third

Judicial District Court's Entry of Judgment in favor of Tel Tech,
Inc., on February 8, 1989,

on a jury verdict. (See R. 884-886,

895-896, 910-911.)
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that Tel Tech did

not supply a defective and unreasonably dangerous product which
had caused injury, and that one who provides installation
services of a non-defective product is not subject to a claim of
strict liability, but is subject only to a negligence claim?
2.

Was the trial court's jury admonition to disregard only

testimony relating to unreasonably dangerous product sufficient
to avoid prejudice to plaintiff's negligence claim?

3.

If the case is remanded for another trial on

negligence, may defendant now assert plaintiff's comparative
negligence as an affirmative defense?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature Of The Case
On January 1, 1981, Appellant Robert E. Conger fell from the
top of a stainless steel milk tanker on which he was walking.

On

September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger filed an action seeking damages
for personal injuries sustained in the fall against Tel Tech,
Inc., and others.

The action against Tel Tech alleged that Tel

Tech was negligent in its modification of the tanker, which
included installation of cleaning equipment inside the tanker,
because Tel Tech had failed to install walk protection on the top
of the tanker and to warn of the necessity of such walk
protection.

Near the end of trial, Mr. Conger amended his

Complaint also to allege a theory of strict products liability.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

On April 18, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Second Amended
Complaint.

On July 23, 1984, Tel Tech filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment on the grounds that Tel Tech owed no duty to warn Meadow
Gold, that any duty was discharged by Meadow Gold's knowledge of
the hazard, and that Tel Tech did not owe Mr. Conger any duty to
judge the adequacy of Meadow Gold's direction with respect to the
installation of cleaning equipment. (R. 185-86, 189-200.)
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On

September 20, 1984, the trial court filed a Memorandum Decision
granting Tel Tech's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 349-353.)
On November 6, 1984, Mr. Conger filed a Motion to Amend and/or
for Relief From Judgment Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, which the trial court denied. (R. 371-372, 385-386.)
Mr. Conger voluntarily dismissed his claims against Western
General Dairy, Inc., and settled with Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.
and Scott Wetzel Company. (Appellant's Brief, p. i.)

The trial

court ordered those claims dismissed on January 12, 1987, and Mr.
Conger filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 1987, with respect
to the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment for Tel Tech. (R.
622-626.)

After the matter was briefed and argued, on May 13,

1988, this Court issued a Memorandum Decision in which it stated:
[Contractual relationships for the performance of services
impose on each of the contracting parties a general duty of
due care toward the other, apart from the specific
obligations expressed in the contract itself. The care to
be exercised in any particular case depends upon the
circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable
danger involved and must be determined as a question of
fact.
(R. 647-649 (quoting DCR Inc., v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433,
435 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis supplied).)

Stating that under its

contract with Meadow Gold for the performance of services Tel
Tech owed Mr. Conger a duty of reasonable care, this Court
reversed the trial court and remanded the case for trial. The
question for the jury was whether reasonable care required Tel

3

Tech to do more than it agreed to do and had been asked to do
under its service contract. (R. 647-649.)
The case was tried to a jury beginning January 23, 1989, and
concluding January 26, 1989. (R. 922-927.)

On January 25, 1989,

the third day of trial, plaintiff's milk tanker expert, Mr.
Eilers, testified.

Mr. Conger's attorney propounded questions to

Mr. Eilers which sought to establish elements of a strict
liability theory.

Tel Tech strenuously objected to the

questioning on grounds of surprise and that throughout the
lawsuit, the plaintiff had pleaded only negligence.

The trial

court overruled the objection, and allowed the plaintiff to amend
the Complaint and elicit responses from his expert in an effort
to satisfy the elements of a strict liability theory. (R. 922,
pp. 28-38.)
At the close of evidence, the trial court entertained Tel
Tech's Motion for Directed Verdict on plaintiff's claim of strict
liability.
facts:

The Motion was based on the following undisputed

Tel Tech offered the specialized service of heliarc

welding necessary for the installation of stainless steel
components and parts; Meadow Gold, in need of such service, hired
Tel Tech to supply parts and labor for the customized
installation of two spray ball cleaners in the skin of Meadow
Gold's tanker trailer; the spray balls themselves worked
perfectly and normally and did not cause injury; as part of the

4

service contract, Tel Tech was not asked to install and had not
installed walk protection; regardless of how plaintiff attempted
now to couch the claim, the overwhelming, undisputed evidence was
that the manner of the service performed, rather than any
"product," was the alleged cause of plaintiff's injuries, see
Footnotes 2 and 3, infra; the overwhelming case law precluded the
application of a theory of strict liability where (1) the parts
that were supplied with the installation service were not
themselves defective, and (2) the plaintiff's injury allegedly
arose out of a legal deficiency in the service itself. (R. 927,
pp. 3-28.)
After hearing argument on the Motion and reviewing the cited
authorities, the trial court ruled that the evidence was
undisputed, that the spray balls themselves were not defective
and had not caused injury, but rather the gravamen of the claim
was with Tel Tech's installation service.

Where Tel Tech had not

supplied a defective product that had caused injury, but had
allegedly performed an installation contract in a negligent
manner, the court would allow submission of the case to the jury
based on negligence, but not on strict liability. (R. 927, pp.
16-28.)
The trial court then informed the jury that the case would
be submitted to them for decision on negligence, a fault theory,
and that they should disregard only that part of Mr. Eilers1
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testimony that focused solely on the product liability theory.
(R. 926, p. 11-12.)
The case was submitted to the jury on Mr. Conger's
negligence claim, and the jury returned a verdict of no cause of
action. (R. 890-892.)

The trial court entered judgment on the

jury verdict on February 8, 1989. (R. 884-886, 895-896, 910-911.)
C. Statement of Facts
1.

On January 1, 1981, while employed by Beatrice Foods

Company, Meadow Gold Division ("Meadow Gold11), appellant Robert
E. Conger ("Mr. Conger") was attempting to clean the interior
compartments of a stainless steel milk tank trailer.

The trailer

had in the top two interior cleaning devices, known as spray
balls.
2.

(R. 925, pp. 168-169, 173-174, 178-181.)
A spray ball consists of a piece of stainless steel

tubing inserted through the skin and shell, into the tanker
itself and welded into place.
ferrule when not in use.

It is sealed off by a hex nut

The station is used as a port through

which a chemical solution and rinsing water are pumped into the
tank in connection with the cleaning of the tanker's inside.

It

derives its name from the actual device through which the
solution and water flow.

A small spray ball is attached to a

tube, which is connected to the hose accessing the chemical
solution and water.

As the liquids are pumped through the ball,

it sprays them systematically throughout the entire inside of the
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tanker compartment. (R. 633, pp. 9, 24; 924, pp. 55-57; 925, p.
130.)
3.

The top of the tanker trailer also had two hatches that

accessed the respective compartments, the openings of which
extended above the top of the trailer surface. (R. 925, pp. 157158, 160.)
4.

While walking along the top of the tanker trailer and

holding onto the end of a hose to hook up to the rear spray ball,
Mr. Conger stepped over the rear hatch, placed his foot into
spilled grease or milk fat he had failed to clean, slipped and
fell off the top of the trailer, and sustained serious personal
injuries. (R. 925, pp. 114-116, 177-181, 201, 205-206, 233.)
5.

Meadow Gold, Mr. Conger's employer, had purchased the

milk tanker in March of 1979; two months later, in May of 1979,
Meadow Gold entered an oral contract with Tel Tech to provide
parts and labor for the customized installation of the two spray
balls into the tanker trailer.

(R. 924, pp. 19, 21, 22, 33-35,

38.)
6.

Tel Tech was in the business of selling chemicals,

stainless steel parts and certain specialized services to the
dairy industry.

Tel Tech provided the specialized service of

heliarc welding necessary for the technical and sanitary
requirements for stainless steel welding in dairy equipment.
Stainless steel welding differs significantly from other types of
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welding, especially with thin gauges of stainless steel such as
those involved in the installation of spray ball cleaning devices
in the skin of a milk tanker. (R. 924, pp. 24, 27-29, 49, 55-57,
60-62; 925, p. 133; 922, pp. 70, 88-91, 113-114.)
7.

Tel Tech had been hired on numerous prior occasions to

perform stainless steel installation or welding services at
Meadow Gold's plants, and Meadow Gold frequently supplied the
fittings and tubing it wanted installed. (R. 924, pp. 24, 29;
922, pp. 99-101, 113-114, 120.)
8.

The milk tanker at issue required two spray balls, one

for each tanker compartment; without them, the interior of the
trailer could only be cleaned manually by a Meadow Gold employee
who was required to enter the compartments and brush on chemical
solution and rinsing water. (R. 925, pp. 155-156, 171.)
9.

After the spray ball stations were welded into the skin

of the tanker, the operator or other employee responsible for
cleaning the tanker was only required to remove the hex nut
ferrule and connect the tube to a hose through which cleaning and
rinsing solution would be pumped. (R. 925, pp. 168-169, 173-174.)
10*

Donald Dvorak, a local transportation manager for

Meadow Gold, contacted Tel Tech and reached an oral agreement
with Tel Tech to provide parts and labor to install two spray
balls in the top of the tanker trailer.

Mr. Dvorak never

discussed with Tel Tech anything other than the installation of
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the spray balls.

Mr. Dvorak never instructed Tel Tech to install

walk protection along the top of the tanker trailer in the area
of the individual spray balls and no facts indicate that Meadow
Gold wanted walk protection.

On May 7, 1979, Tel Tech installed

the two spray balls and billed Meadow Gold $170.00 plus tax for
the parts and labor. (R. 924, pp. 22-23, 31, 33-38, 46; 922, pp.
78-79.)
11.

At the time Tel Tech welded the spray balls into the

tanker, Meadow Gold had an arrangement with Western General Dairy
for the use of Western General Dairy's facility to clean its
tankers.

The Western General facility had a portable, swinging

walkway mounted above the tanker cleaning bay so that it could be
lowered directly onto the crown near the spray ball stations and
would not necessitate an employee to walk along the top of the
trailer to access the spray balls.

The two spray balls were

installed at the Western General facility, and Tel Tech was
unaware of where the trailer would be cleaned. (R. 925, pp. 54,
165-168; 924, p. 21; 922, pp. 94-95, 115.)
12.

Tel Tech faithfully performed the service Meadow Gold

had requested.

No evidence exists in the record of Meadow Gold

ever complaining that Tel Tech's work was deficient or that the
spray balls did not adequately perform their intended function—
the cleaning and rinsing of the inside of the tanker.
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Meadow

Gold accepted Tel Tech's services and paid the $178.50 statement
in full. (R. 922, pp. 92-93.)
13.

Tel Tech's specialty was narrowly focused.

Tel Tech

was not in the business of designing, manufacturing or selling
milk tankers or safety features on milk tankers.

Tel Tech never

held itself out as having knowledge or experience with respect to
safety features on milk tankers. Tel Tech was never asked to
install such safety features and was never consulted or asked to
consult with respect to such safety features. (R. 633, pp. 20-26;
636, pp. 11-12, 21-23; 638, pp. 36-37; 924, p. 64; 925, pp. 139,
142.)
14.

Mr. Conger had driven that particular truck and tanker

approximately 500 times prior to the accident.

He had driven the

tanker some fifteen to sixteen months after the spray balls were
installed until his accident.

As part of his duties in driving

the tanker, he was required to clean the compartment interiors
after he was finished delivering each load.

It was also his

responsibility to clean the exterior of the trailer, as needed.
(R. 925, pp. 162, 168-169, 154, 171-174, 201; 924, pp. 26, 4143.)
15.

To clean the interior compartments, Mr. Conger would

climb a ladder to the top of the trailer, walk along the top to
the spray ball stations and connect the hose to the spray balls.
(R. 925, pp. 168-169, 171-174.)
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16.

Mr. Conger did the cleaning in this manner 300-400

times before his accident.

Prior to the accident, he was clearly

aware of the danger associated with walking along the top of the
stainless steel trailer, had spoken with other employees about
the danger, and had asked his employer to remedy the danger by
putting up some form of walk protection.

His employer did

nothing.* (R. 925, pp. 172, 176, 217, 219, 228.)
17.

On September 13, 1982, Mr. Conger sued Tel Tech.

In

his Second Amended Complaint, filed April 18, 1984, he alleged
that Tel Tech "made certain modifications to said tanker, which
include the installation of clean-out valves on the top of the
tank," and that Tel Tech "negligently failed to install walk
protection to the clean-out valves and negligently failed to warn
and advise of the necessity of such walk protection." (R. 156.)
18.

As set forth above, see B. Course of Proceedings and

Disposition Below, supra., on appeal from the prior summary
disposition, the case once before was in this Court on the
question of whether one who performs a service contract has a

1

With the benefit of hindsight, Meadow Gold has stated, had
Tel Tech installed some form of walk protection, it certainly
would have paid for it. However, Meadow Gold's statement may be
disingenuous because Mr. Conger was unable to get Meadow Gold to
provide some form of walk protection and Meadow Gold's local
transportation manager, Donald Dvorak, had given some thought to
putting up walk protection along the top of the trailer but never
did anything about it. (R. 924, p. 47.)

11

duty to exercise reasonable care beyond the contract
requirements, and the case was remanded for trial. (R. 647-649.)
19.

At trial, Mr. Conger's milk tanker expert, Mr. Eilers,

testified extensively regarding his experience in the dairy and
tanker trailer industry, various types of cleaning equipment for
dairy trailers, various installations of cleaning equipment,
various safety equipment and apparatus and his opinion regarding
standards in the industry for an installer of cleaning equipment.
He gave his opinion that where access to a cleaning system
required walking along the top of a tanker trailer, the minimum
standard of care required the installation of some kind of walk
protection.

He testified that in his opinion, Tel Tech had

failed to meet the minimum standard of care required of an
installer of cleaning equipment. (R. 922, pp. 10-27, 40.)
20.

Mr. Eilers also testified on cross examination

regarding the conduct of Mr. Conger, the he would not have done
what Mr. Conger did, and that he would have recognized the grease
Mr. Conger stepped in as a hazard.

He testified that the manner

in which Mr. Conger cleaned the hatches made it more likely to
create a slippery or hazardous condition on the tanker.

He

testified that safety was everyone's concern, including Mr.
Conger's. (R. 922, pp. 67-69.)
21.

Mr. Eilers testified that one who provides installation

services of cleaning equipment in a tanker trailer is not a
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manufacturer, as did Dr. Thomas Blotter, Tel Tech's engineer. (R.
922, pp. 18, 156.)
22.

Over Tel Tech's objection, Mr. Eilers then testified

that in his opinion, Tel Tech had created a hazardous condition,
and that the "manner" of installation of the spray balls was
defective and unreasonably dangerous for lack of walk protection.
(R. 922, pp. 34-38.)
23.

At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Tel

Tech's Motion for Directed Verdict on the strict liability claim,
on the grounds that the theory of strict liability does not apply
to a contract for installation services, the product itself was
not defective and had not caused injury, and plaintiff's claim
went to the manner of installation rather than any product
defect.2 (R. 927, pp. 3-28.)
2

Not only was the evidence at trial undisputed that the
spray balls were not, of themselves, defective, that no "product"
had caused injury, and that plaintiff's allegations went to the
adequacy of the installation service, but all of plaintiff's
pretrial allegations and arguments, including arguments to this
Court, were based solely on the adequacy of Tel Tech's
performance 3f its service contract with Meadow Gold—the
customized installation of the spray balls. Up to the time of
trial, the plaintiff had contended, successfully to this Court,
that Tel Tech was the provider of a specialized service and had a
duty to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its
service. The following examples of plaintiff's argument are
taken from Appellant's prior Briefs to this Court:
Meadow Gold had requested Tel Tech to install the spray
balls on the tanker because it understood and relied upon
Tel Tech to have expertise in the installation and servicing
of dairy equipment and in working with stainless steel
tankers.
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(Prior Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied).)
As pointed out in Appellant's opening brief and again in
detail in Tel Tech's brief at pp. 6 and 7, Tel Tech and
Meadow Gold agreed, in other words contracted, for Tel Tech
to provide a service to Meadow Gold, namely, the
installation of the spray balls in the tanker. Pursuant to
the contract, Tel Tech performed the service and received
consideration therefor.
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied).)
Citing Restatement (Second) of Torts S 323 (1965), Negligent
Performance of Undertaking to Render Services, Mr. Conger then
argued that:
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized and approved the
generally accepted tort doctrine that "contractual
relationships for the performance of services impose on each
of the contracting parties a general duty of due care toward
the other, apart from the specific obligations of the
contract itself."
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis supplied)
(citation omitted).)
Mr. Conger then argued:
Thus, based upon the undisputed fact that Tel Tech
contracted to perform and did perform a service for Meadow
Gold, Tel Tech owed a general duty to exercise due care to
Meadow Gold with respect to Tel Tech's agreement to install
the spray balls.
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (emphasis supplied).)
A careful reading of DCR[lnc. v. Peak Alarm Co.] compels the
rejection of Tel Tech's attempted distinctions as well as
the faulty analysis of the trial court in its Memorandum
Opinion, since a contractual relationship for the
performance of services existed between the relevant parties
in both DCR and this case.
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 8 (emphasis supplied).)
Moreover, contrary to cases such as Ragsdale [v. K-Mart
Corp. 468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. App. 1984)] and Stodghill [v.
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24.

The trial court then explained to the jury:

Before I instruct you, I need to apprise you of one
legal matter that has been taken care of. Originally, the
plaintiff was making a claim against the defendant on two
different legal theories; one was a fault theory and one
was—what's called a product liability theory, which is a
theory of law upon which people can recover from defective
products that cause injuries regardless of fault.
I dismissed the second claim for legal reasons which
the court doesn't need to concern you with. And you will be
asked to determine this case based on the negligence or
fault theory. But some of the evidence that came into trial
related solely to the—the product theory, evidence that the
product that was sold was defective and unreasonably safe.
You'll hear some of the discussions between the lawyers,
whether that evidence should be admitted, because that legal
theory is no longer part of the case. That evidence is not
relevant and will be stricken from the record, and you
should treat it as if you've never known it.
(R. 926, p. 11.)

Frat-Allis Constr. Mach., Inc., 163 Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d
183 (1982)], Tel Tech's negligent conduct here arose not in
the context of a distant manufacturer or supplier of a new
product having no contract with the plaintiff or no
opportunity to know of the use to which the product would be
put; Tel Tech's negligence occurred in connection with a
contract with Meadow Gold to modify a specific tanker to be
used by Meadow Gold in a particular manner . . . .
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, p. 12 (emphasis supplied).)
The trial court's ruling is consistent with appellant's prior
arguments to this Court—that the product itself was not the
problem, but rather Tel Tech's alleged negligent service pursuant
to its installation contract with Meadow Gold was the problem
(see R. 647-649)—and with this Court's Memorandum Decision,
dated May 13, 1988. (See R. 647-649.)
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25.

The court then instructed the jury on plaintifffs

negligence claim, defined "negligence" and "ordinary care," and
explained that:
Tel Tech[] owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff
to install the spray balls in a reasonably safe manner, and
to avoid creating a hazardous or dangerous condition. If
you find that defendant, Tel Tech, failed to exercise
reasonable care as a proximate result of which plaintiff was
injured, you must then determine whether the plaintiff
failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety in a
manner which proximately caused his injuries.
(R. 926, pp. 18-20; see also R. 847-883.)
26.

After the jury was instructed, Mr. Conger's attorney

argued the case relying heavily upon Mr. Eilers1 testimony
regarding standards in the industry, minimum standard of care,
and the alleged deficiency of Tel Tech's conduct in its
installation of the cleaning equipment. (R. 926, pp. 40-41.)
27.

The jury found that Tel Tech had not failed to exercise

reasonable care. (R. 890-892.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Pursuant to a service contract, Tel Tech provided parts and
labor for the customized service of heliarc welding two spray
balls into the skin of Meadow Gold's trailer.
supplied were defective or caused injury.

No parts it

Plaintiff's claim of

injury goes to the manner of installation into a preexisting
product not supplied by Tel Tech, rather than any cognizable
"product" defect.

Alleged deficient installation services,
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absent a defect in the product installed, are not subject to the
strict liability doctrine.
Legal and policy issues which underlie strict liability
doctrine show the inapplicability of that doctrine to this case.
Strict liability is not appropriate where one provides customized
skill and services not subject to the standard quality control
processes of the factory.

One who hires an expert for services,

under the law, is entitled to only reasonable care and
competence.

The problem of consumer difficulty to trace,

pinpoint and prove remote fault up the distribution chain to
distant mass producers of goods does not apply where services
were not part of a marketing chain and where the transaction
emanated from a face-to-face relationship.

The risk distribution

justification for strict liability does not apply in the service
context because of the inherent problems service providers have
in spreading losses as compared to manufacturers of goods.
The trial court's jury admonition to disregard testimony
going only to the strict liability claim accurately and fairly
stated the law and avoided the confusion, misunderstanding and
prejudice that otherwise would have occurred.
If the case is remanded for another trial on grounds of
prejudice, Tel Tech may assert Mr. Conger's comparative
negligence as an affirmative defense because any jury confusion
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would apply equally to Tel Tech's defense and the jury's finding
of no negligence on Mr. Conger is unreliable.

ARGUMENT
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT TEL TECH DID NOT
SUPPLY A DEFECTIVE AND UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS PRODUCT
WHICH HAD CAUSED INJURY, AND THAT ONE WHO PROVIDES
CUSTOMIZED INSTALLATION SERVICES OF A NON-DEFECTIVE
PRODUCT IS NOT SUBJECT TO A CLAIM OF STRICT LIABILITY.
Plaintiff's appeal presents the legal question of the
conceptual reach of the strict liability theory into the area of
service contracts or the provision of services.
A.

The Undisputed And Admitted Facts Show That The Gravamen

Of Plaintiff's Claim Goes To A Service And Not A Product.
Inconsistent with his original pleading, negligence theory,
prior arguments to this Court3 and prior ruling of this Court,
3

In addition to Mr. Conger's prior arguments to this Court
set forth in Footnote 2, appellant cited Restatement (Second) of
Torts S 323 (1965), Negligent Performance of Undertaking to
Render Services, to show a duty of reasonable care. Section 323
states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise
such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
18

Mr. Conger attempts to characterize Tel Tech's offending conduct
no longer as the negligent provision of services, but now as the
supply of a defective product—a "cleaning system," incorporated
into Meadow Gold's tanker trailer.

Although alternative pleading

is a common practice, plaintiff's new-found claim of strict
liability presents a problem of mutual exclusivity with his prior
claim and this Court's prior ruling because alleged deficient
services are not subject to a claim of strict liability.
Point I, B., infra.

See

Despite his efforts now to classify the

terms of the service contract as a product for purposes of
Section 402A strict liability, plaintiff claims injury due to the
manner of installation.

This Court already has recognized that

Tel Tech was in the position of a contractor for the provision of
custom services, as has Mr. Conger, see Footnotes 2 and 3, and
the trial court properly recognized that it was the customized

(Emphasis supplied.) Citing DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d
433 (Utah 1983), Williams v. Melby, 6S9 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) and
Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & Heating, 17 Utah 2d 138, 405
P.2d 611 (1965), Mr. Conger argued that:
The general duty between contracting parties is not limited
only to service contracts which are ongoing until an injury
occurs, but includes contracts such as here, where work is
performed, the service has been completed, and the injury
occurs some time thereafter.
(Prior Reply Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-5 (emphasis supplied).)
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manner of installation—that presented the only factual scenario
for possible relief.*
First, the only parts or "product11 Tel Tech supplied were
the spray balls themselves.

The devices worked properly, were

not defective and did not cause injury.*

Tel Tech did not

manufacture, sell, distribute or supply the tanker trailer with
its curved, stainless steel skin, the hose or the Meadow Gold
facility where Mr. Conger ultimately cleaned the tanker.
Second, because of its specialized skill and expertise of
heliarc welding, Meadow Gold hired Tel Tech to perform a
customized service contract which Tel Tech did according to the

* The standard of review of a directed verdict is the same
as that imposed upon the trial court: Whether, viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, "reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from the
evidence presented." Management Committee of Graystone Pines
Homeowners Assfn v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98
(Utah 1982); Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044,
1046-47 (Utah 1978). However, it is the trial court's
prerogative to determine what law applies to the facts presented.
The trial court would commit error by instructing on a legal
theory, such as strict liability, where the facts did not present
a cognizable claim under that theory. See, e.g., Gray v. Scott,
565 P.2d 76 (Utah 1977).
5

Viewing the undisputed evidence in a light most
favorable to plaintiff, reasonable minds could not differ that
the product Tel Tech did supply did not satisfy the elements of a
strict liability claim. It supplied only the spray balls and
installed them at Meadow Gold's behest. The spray balls worked
perfectly. It did not provide any other product or component,
including the tanker trailer, the connecting hose, or the Meadow
Gold facility where the trailer was cleaned. With respect to the
product Tel Tech did supply, the strict liability claim failed as
a matter of law. See Footnote 4.

20

contract's specific terms.

Had Tel Tech simply sold the spray

ball parts to Meadow gold without installing them, they would
have been useless to Meadow Gold without the specialized skill of
heliarc welding and their installation into the trailer.
Third, the safety engineering aspects of the installation
contract that Tel Tech allegedly overlooked related to the
location and placement of the spray balls rather than their
function or operation—clearly, an alleged problem with the
manner of installation.
Fourth, plaintiff successfully persuaded this Court that Tel
Tech had performed a service contract and that one who performs a
service contract is held to a reasonable person standard, which
presented a fact question on whether Tel Tech should have
installed walk protection. See Footnotes 2 and 3 and R. 647-649.
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 402A (1965) requires the
sale of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to the
ordinary user or consumer.

Many courts have addressed the

question of what qualifies as a "product" for Section 402A strict
liability purposes.

In a hybrid sale-service transaction,

Section 402A liability is limited to defects in the product
supplied and does not include the non-negligent mistakes in
service.

For example, in Davis v. Pacific Diesel Power, Co.

41 Or. App. 597, 598 P.2d 1228 (1979), the defendant
sold rebuilt engines for compressors and, pursuant
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to a contract with plaintifffs employer, installed the rebuilt
engines in the compressors.

The compressors were used to provide

oxygen for breathing apparatus.

As a result of a fire,

lubricating oil inside the compressor ignited, releasing carbon
monoxide into the workers1 supply of breathing air.

Plaintiffs

alleged that the engines were defective and unreasonably
dangerous because of claimed defects in the automatic shut-down
system of the compressor.

Affirming the trial court's order

striking plaintiffs1 counts in strict liability, the appellate
court found that the problem was not with the product defendant
had sold to plaintiffs1 employer. Rather, the defendant had
failed to install a functional shut-off system for the
compressor.

The court agreed with the trial court that

plaintiff's real contention was not with the product supplied,
but with the method or manner or installation; as a matter of
law, plaintiff had failed to establish the sale of a defective
product.

Plaintiff's claim was properly submitted to the jury on

only the negligence claim.

598 P.2d at 1230, 1232-33.

In the leading case of Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 270
Or. 498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974), the court held that the negligent
installation of a non-defective product does not fall within the
definition of a "dangerously defective product" for strict
liability purposes.

Defendant had mounted a non-defective tire

on plaintiff's car and allegedly had failed to tighten the lug
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nuts and to inspect the wheel assembly, causing injury.
Plaintiff alleged and argued that the "product" defendant had
sold was not merely the (non-defective) tire, but the inadequate
installation of the tire on the car, making the car unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use.

Rejecting plaintiff's conceptual

extension of "dangerously defective product," the court
recognized the claim for what is was:

"Plaintiff contends that

the defendant should be held strictly liable in tort for the
negligent installation of the wheel onto the axle."

Id. at 77.

The court refused to accept plaintiff's contention that defendant
had sold what plaintiff herein might characterize as a "wheel
system."
Affirming the trial court's refusal to submit to the jury
the question of strict liability, the court made several
pertinent observations:
"When the contract between plaintiff and defendant is
commercial in character, the courts are willing to
extend liability without fault to the hybrid saleservice transaction, provided that a defective product
is supplied to the plaintiff or used by the defendant
in the course of performing the service. . . . "
In cases other than the sale-service hybrid transaction
courts have also been reluctant to extend the definition of
"product" beyond the article actually manufactured or
supplied. . . .
In the instant case it is obvious that the product sold to
plaintiff was not dangerously defective. Even if we
accepted plaintiff's version of the cause of the accident,
it was not a dangerously defective tire which caused
plaintiff's injuries, but rather the installation of the
wheel on the hub and axle of the auto.
In such case it
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might be said that plaintiff's auto became dangerously
defective, but certainly not the tire. . . .
It is clear that this was not a proper case for strict
liability in tort and the trial court correctly refused to
submit that issue to the jury.
Id. at 77-78 (citations omitted, emphasis supplied).
Mr. Conger's reliance on another leading case, Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969), is curious
because of its direct application to defendant's position.

In

Gimbel's, defendant sold a permanent wave solution which burned
plaintiff's scalp and forehead.

Because a beauty parlor had sold

and applied the solution, the court recognized that the
transaction involved incidents of a sale and a service.

In

allowing the claim of strict liability to attach to the sale, the
court recognized that, had the defendant simply sold the solution
and plaintiff had applied it herself, she still would have been
burned because of the inherent defects in the wave solution
itself. 258 A.2d at 700-03.

Many courts have commented on the

meaning and reach of Gimbel's.

For example, in Lemley v. J & B

Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977), the court stated:
"There the plaintiff had been injured when an allegedly
defective permanent wave solution was applied to her hair by
the defendant beauty parlor. The Court, in holding the
beauty parlor strictly liable for defects in the permanent
wave solution, was careful to note the sales aspects of what
it saw as a 'sales-service hybrid transaction.' It will be
noted that the Court there did not hold that the beauty
parlor operator would be strictly liable for nonnegligent
mistakes in its own application of the solution, but only
for defects in the solution itself."
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Id. at 1379 (quoting Raritan Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1106, 1115 (3rd Cir. 1972) (emphasis supplied)).
The Hoover court also commented on Gimbel's, as follows:
[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court held a beauty shop strictly
liable under an implied warranty of fitness when defective
permanent wave lotion was applied to a patron's hair. The
court reasoned that if the lotion had been sold over the
counter there would have been strict liability. There was
no logical reason to hold otherwise merely because the
defective lotion was applied in a service context . . . .
In [Gimbel's], as in all sale-service hybrid cases, it is
clear that the product, as opposed to the service, was
defective. . . . In the case at hand, . . . there was no
allegation that the tire was defective.
Hoover, 528 P.2d at 77.
See also Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F.2d 1378, 1379-80
(W.D. Pa. 19?7) (one who supplies parts and service for brake
repair is not subject to claim of strict liability; no evidence
exists to suggest any defects in the components supplied by
defendant in the repair of the brakes); Swenson Trucking &
Excavating Inc., v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113, 1115-17
(Alaska 1980) (alleged defective weld in ram assembly did not
subject defendant to claim of strict liability; for strict
liability to apply, "merchant would . . . have to do something
more than sell an attachment for the vehicle, agree to put it on,
and agree to repair the part of the vehicle that eventually
breaks"); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58 A.D. 2d 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216/
217-18 (1977) (where in-flight fire causing airplane crash was
caused by faulty installation of strobe light system, rather than
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component parts to the system, manner of installation was the
cause and strict liability claim did not attach); Cropper v. Rego
Distribution Center, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1148-49 (D. Del.
1982) (defendant designed and built facility and incorporated
components that were not defective of themselves but put in
system that allegedly created a dangerous situation; professional
services of designer and builder of riser system facility which
caused injury and death were not subject to claim of strict
liability);

Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 361

Pa. Super. 137, 522 A.2d 52, 56-57 (1987) (cited by Mr. Conger)
(non-defective component part supplier does not have a duty to
anticipate dangers that might be associated with integration of
its parts into completed product).
If Tel Tech had sold spray ball parts to Meadow Gold and the
parts themselves had been inherently defective and caused injury,
plaintiff's claim of strict liability might have merit under the
Gimbelf s analysis.

However, it was Tel Tech's narrow,

specialized skill that made the contract valuable to Meadow Gold.
The parts themselves, installed or uninstalled, were not
defective and did not cause injury.
allegedly did.

The manner of installation

Plaintiff's own expert testified that the

"manner" of installation was what made the spray balls defective
and unreasonably dangerous.

He also testified that Tel Tech's

service contract did not qualify Tel Tech as a manufacturer.
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Regardless of plaintiff's belated attempt *•- -^--true the facts
into a cognizable strict
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of law preclude that construct:! on , e
loi',st" of the cases Mr. Congers cites in his Brief are
vastly distinguishable from this case, usually on several
grounds. Those cases were not situations where an independent
contractor, because of its specialized skil 1, was hired to
perform a customized service of installing a non-defective
product into a pre-existing product. In those cases, either the
product itself caused injury, similar to the Gimbel1s analysis,
and/or the original design of the entire system and all parts
were included as part of a finished, uncustomized, marketed
product. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 48
Wash. App 432, 739 P.2d 1177 (1987) (original design problem of
entire system); Nettles v. Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574
(11th Cir. 1986) (original design problem of entire system);
Siebern v. Missouri-Illinois Tractor & Equip. Co., 711 S.W.2d 935
(Mo. App. 1986) (original design problem of entire system); Gann
v. International Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1986)
(original design problem of entire system); Lanclos v. Rockwell
Intern. Corp., 470 So. 2d 924 (La. App. 1985) (original design
problem of entire system); Eldridge v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 24 Ohio App. 3d 94, 493 N.E.2d 293 (1985) (original design
problem of entire system); Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 700 P.2d
830 (Ariz. 1984) (original design problem of entire system);
Arthur v. Avon Inflatables, Ltd., 156 Cal. App. 3d 401, 203 Ca]
Rptr. 1 (1984) (original design problem of entire system);
Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828 (Mo. App.
1984) (original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Boyett, 674 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App. 1984) (original
design problem of entire system); Carter v. Massey Ferguson,
Inc., 716 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1983) (original design problem of
entire system); Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010 (10th Cir.
1983) (original design problem of entire system); Ontai v. Straub
Clinic and Hospital, Inc., 66 Haw, 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983)
(product itself caused injury); Lundy v. Whiting Corp., 93 IIII.
App. 3d 244, 417 N.E.2d 154 (1981) (original design problem of
entire system); General Elec. Co. v. Schmal, 623 S.W.2d 482 (Tex,
App. 1981) (original design problem of entire system); Atkins v.
Blaw Knox Foundry and Mill Mach., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Gonzales, 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App. 1980)
(original design problem of entire system); Caterpillar Tractor

B. The Theory of Strict Liability Does Not Extend To A
Service Contract or the Provision of Services.
It is the Court's prerogative to address and determine the
legal and policy issues which underlie the application and
claimed extension of the strict liability theory. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Northwest National Gas Co.# 284 Or. 571, 588 P.2d 18
(1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Machinery Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.d
1033 (1974).

The law of strict product liability is based on

certain public policy considerations that have no relevance to
this case.

A survey of cases addressing the issue overwhelmingly

Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (original design problem
of entire system); Allen v. Heil Co., 285 Or. 109, 589 P.2d 1120
(1979) (original design problem of entire system); Barker v. Lull
Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1978) (original design problem of entire system); Union Supply
Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978) (original design
problem of entire system); Brannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital
Corp., 69 111. App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978) (product itself
caused injury); Brown v. North Am. Mfg. Co., 176 Mont. 98, 576
P.2d 711 (1978) (original design problem of entire system);
Hornbeck v. Western States Fire Apparatus, Inc., 280 Or. 647, 572
P.2d 620 (1977) (original design problem of entire system);
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974)
(part itself caused injury); Lugue v. McLain, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501
P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (original design problem of
entire system); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d
281 (1972) (original design problem of entire system); Worrell v.
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (product itself caused
injury); Carpenter v. Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481
P.2d 924 (1971) (identical to Gimbel's); Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970)
(original design problem of entire system); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (original design
problem of entire system); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67
111. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347 (1966) (part itself caused
injury).
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to d s i l.uation where one performs a customized service contract."7
7

I'm addition iu the cases cited in text, the following
cases hold that a provider of services, such as Tel Tech, is not
subject to a claim of strict liability. See Kaplan v. C Lazy U
Ranch, 615 F supp. 234 (D Colo 1985} (where plaintiff fell
from horse she had leased, she had no problem identifying
defendants as ones responsible for alleged act of negligence and
strict liability claim was barred); Barry v. Stevens Equip, Co.,
176 Ga. App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985) (where employer had asked
defendant to completely rebuild machine but had not asked for
safety devices, contract was for services and defendant was not
subject to claim of strict liability); Industrial Risk Insurers
v. Creole Production Services, 746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1984)
(service of pipeline consulting not subject to strict product
liability theory); Kodiak Electric Ass'n, Inc. v. Delaval
Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1984) (repairer and rebunaer
of generator not subject to claim of strict products liability);
Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal. App. 3d 404, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984)
(designer and constructor of building not subject to doctrines of
implied warranty and strict liability where primary objectives of
the transaction are to obtain services); siciliano v. Capital
City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984) (amusement
park owner/operator held to standard of reasonable care and is
not subject to strict liability); Winans v. Rockwell Intern.
Corp., 705 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) (a repairer of engine on fithat exploded in midair could not be held strictly liable for
engine defects existing after it overhauled the engines; repairer
provides services which are not covered under strict liability);
Kohr v. Johns-Manville Corp., 534 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(inspector of industrial plant could be held liable for
negligence, but not for strict liability); Stafford v.
International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir. 1981) (if
transaction is predominantly service oriented with incidental
transfer of parts and components, strict liability doctrine does
not attach); Hall v. State, 106 Misc. 2d 860, 435 N.Y.S.2d 663
(1981) (provider of professional services not subject to suit ::)i:i
grounds of strict products liability; design and problems
therewith are not a "product" but provision of professional
services); Stuckey v. Young Expl. Co., 586 P.2d 726 (Okl. 1978)
(a repairer is held to a negligence standard and does not fall
within the theory of strict liability); Walla v. United States,
432 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (United States government's
planning and designing cow yard are services which are beyond the
scope of strict liability doctrine); Costaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977) (designer and

In addition to the fact that a contract for services does not
fall within the express coverage of Section 402A, as adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979) or the Court's justification for
its adoption, the reasons are myriad for the overwhelming refusal
to extend Section 402A's parameters to service contracts.
First, a supplier or manufacturer of a defective product is
in a qualitatively different position than someone such as Tel
Tech that provides a specialized, custom service, because of its
ability in mass production to develop standardized processes and
quality control. (Mr. Conger himself recognized this and other
policy issues which distinguish the service contract situation

construction supervisor of chemical facility cannot be held
liable in absence of negligence);
Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider
Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977) (ski area operator is
not manufacturer or seller of tramway but only provides a
service, i.e., transportation up the mountain slope); Raritan
Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458 F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir.
197 2) (strict liability did not extend to a servicer of landing
gear on airplane which crashed); Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10
Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969) (claim of strict liability by
hotel patron who slipped on bath mat was properly dismissed);
Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist who
designed contact lenses for plaintiff's particular physical
requirements and needs, developed contact lenses after the
physical exam specifically for plaintiff, and whose specific
lenses were not offered to the general public in regular channels
of trade, was not subject to claim of strict liability);
Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service Co., 427 P.2d 833
(Alaska 1967) (defendant who failed properly to repair boiler not
subject to claim of strict liability); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94
N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) (dentist who broke needle
inside patient while injecting local anesthetic not subject to
strict liability).
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"Suppliers and manufacturers, who typically supply and
produce components in large quantities, make standard goods
and develop standard processes. They can thus maintain high
quality control standards in the controlled environment of
the factor[y]. On the other hand, the architect or
contractor can pre-test and standardize construction designs
and plans only in a limited fashion
In addition, the
inspection, supervision and observation of construction by
architects and contractors involves individual expertise not
susceptible to the quality contro] standards of the
factor],; "
Id. at 828 (q noting Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 of
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[t]he services of experts are sought because of their
special skill. They have a duty to exercise the ordinary
skill and competence of members of their profession, and a
failure to discharge that duty will subject them to
liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are
not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect
only reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance."
Allied Properties v. John A. Bloom and Associates, Engineers, 25
Cal* App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 264 (1972) (engineering
services not covered by doctrine of strict liability) (quoting
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954)).
A similar and related policy consideration for adoption of
strict product liability was the consumer's difficulty to trace,
pinpoint and prove fault up the distribution chain to a distant
mass producer of goods.

In dismissing plaintiff's claim of

strict products liability in a contract for services, the court
in Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1981), stated:
Further, the policy considerations responsible for the
evolution of the doctrine of strict tort liability have no
relevance to the facts of this case. As originally proposed
strict products liability was to provide a means of recovery
of damages for product-caused accidents against retailers
and wholesalers in situations where the manufacturer was not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court and the
manufacturer's pockets were not deep enough. (See e.g.,
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099,
1114-24.) This consumer oriented policy also evolved to
provide a means for injured parties to recover damages
against manufacturers of defective products who were
otherwise insulated from direct contact with the consumer or
user by the wholesalers and retailers involved in the modern
mass marketing chain. . . .
Unlike the mass production of products for distribution to
the consuming public, there exists no mass production of
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services which defendants 1 7-Eleven store provides. These
services are custom-tailored to meet the needs of the
particular customers in the neighborhood. Consequently,
there exists no body of distant consumers who are confronted
with the difficult burden of tracing incompetent workmanship
by the service provider. The transaction in this case
emanated from the face to face relationship. Once plaintiff
was injured as a result of faulty service, an action for
negligence provides him with both an effective and
reasonable remedy.
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comes into direct contact with the one offering service and is
aware or can determine what work was performed and who performed
itff); K-Mart Corp, v, Midcon Realty Group of Conn., 489 F. Supp.
813, 819 (D. Conn. 1980) ("Indeed, the ability of K-Mart to
isolate the architect as a possible source of negligence
distinguishes this case from the typical strict tort liability
cases involving defective products.

An injured consumer's need

to overcome the practical obstacles to identifying the possible
wrongdoers in a mass production, mass distribution context is a
rationale advanced in support of the strict liability
doctrine. . . . In this context, it would be inappropriate to
extend the doctrine of strict tort liability and dispense with
the requirement that K-Mart plead and ultimately prove [the
architectf s] negligence").
Risk distribution was also a primary consideration in the
development of strict liability doctrine. See Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944).

Many courts have explained the inapplicability

of risk distribution in a service contract setting.

For example,

in Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 438 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1981), the court stated:
[R]etailers or manufacturers are able to proportion their
losses among the consuming public simply by increasing the
cost of their products which is viewed as a minimal cost
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when, compared tc J-1" n " s suffered b y the injured customer
Moreover, risk distribution, which constitutes the
fundamental underpinning for imposing strict tort liabix
on sellers in the distributive chain is an inappropriate
policy consideration in a service oriented business, ^
service provider ultimately must absorb the financial
liability or endeavor to spread the loss among a limited
number of customers. This limited capability of risk
distribution would jeopardize the continued vitality of
service providers, like defendants
* -
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intentional misconduct111) (quoting Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d
481, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954)).
Two basic conclusions emerge from the above case analysis.
First, Tel Tech is in the position of a provider of customized
services.

Second, under the facts of this case, Tel Tech is not

subject to the doctrine of strict products liability.

Because of

its skill and expertise in heliarc welding, Tel Tech was hired to
perform a customized service—weld two spray balls into the top
of an existing trailer.

Plaintiff has successfully argued to

this Court that in such a contract for services, the installer
has a duty of ordinary care.

However, Tel Tech was not in a

position analogous to a distant, mass producer or distributor
that is subject to standardized quality control procedures in a
controlled environment.

Rather, Tel Tech's customized service

involved individual expertise and design engineering not subject
to factory controls.
Because plaintiff's claim is with the manner of installation
rather than the spray balls themselves, the defective product
problem of pinpointing, tracing and proving a remote act of
negligence does not exist.

Plaintiff's problem of proof of fault

does not extend up the distribution chain, where the sale of
defective, injury-causing spray balls would.

In this personal

service context, Mr. Conger himself came into direct contact with
Tel Tech.

He was intimately aware of what work was performed and
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T H E T R I A L C 0 U R T i S J U R Y ADMONITION TO D i S REGARD ONLY
TESTIMONY GOING SOLELY TO THE STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM
CORRECTLY INFORMED THE JURY OF THE DIFFERENCE IN LEGAL
CONCEPTS TN AVOIDING CONFUSION AND PREJUDICE

Mr

Conger contends that the trial court's admonition to the

jury t ::: :il isrecrard testimony that focused on I IIH strict liability
t h e o r y createui n onfusion
p r e j u d i c e d Mi

m1 n ni iiiiiii i1. ui J Hie i t.n m m i mi i m 1111 n in MI m m >»

(longer 1 h oegl lgence claim

nu!i i
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I" I ii i n t i f £' s cont n o t i o n

First, trial judges frequently grant motions for directed
verdict as to some, but not all, claims, and commonly instruct
juries on the consequences of the elimination of a claim and the
need to disregard certain evidence going solely to that claim.
Second, the claimed interrelatedness between Mr. Conger's
claim of negligence and his claim of strict liability is a ruse.
Plaintiff's expert testified extensively regarding the standard
of reasonable care in the industry and Tel Tech's fault in
respect thereto.

Then, the focus of the testimony changed and,

over objection, Mr. Eilers testified regarding the unreasonably
dangerous condition of the "product" itself.

As is shown by the

distinction in Mr. Eilers' testimony, the case law draws the same
obvious distinction between negligence (fault—look to the
conduct of the alleged wrongdoer) and strict liability (no-fault
—look to the condition of a product).

See e.g., Brown v.

Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d
470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988); Smith v. Home Light and Power
Co., 734 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1987); Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co.,
102 Wash. 2d 68, 684 P.2d 692 (1984).

The difference between the

two theories is the focus of the trier of fact.

The trial

court's admonition correctly informed the jury of the differences
in the legal theories, that they would be asked to determine the
case on the fault theory only, and that the evidence going solely
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correct ruling on Mr. Conger's strict liability claim.

The trial

court's explanation to the jury was fair and accurate and did not
prejudice Mr. Conger's negligence claim.

If Mr. Conger felt that

the instruction was inadequate or confusing in any way, he
certainly could have offered what he felt to be an appropriate
alternative.®
POINT III
IF THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR ANOTHER TRIAL ON
NEGLIGENCE, TEL TECH IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT MR. CONGER'S
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

8

Even if the trial court's word choice, timing, or some
similar aspect of the instruction were subject to question, such
problems do not justify upsetting the jury's verdict. As the
United States Supreme Court stated:
This Court has long held that "'[a litigant] is entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect
trials." Trials are costly, not only for the parties, but
also for the jurors performing their civic duty and for
society which pays the judges and support personnel who
manage the trials. It seems doubtful that our judicial
system would have the resources to provide litigants with
perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast
of its constantly increasing case-load. Even this straightforward products liability suit extended over a three-week
period.
We have also come a long way from the time when all trial
error was presumed prejudicial and reviewing courts were
considered "'citadels of technology.'" The harmless-error
rules adopted by this Court and Congress embody the
principle that courts should exercise judgment in preference
to the automatic reversal for "error" and ignore errors that
do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553
(1984) (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32
(1973) and Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)).
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Therefore, the jury's finding on Mr. Conger's fault was in
disregard of the instructions, went beyond their charge, and is
unreliable.
CONCLUSION
The extensive factual and legal history of this case shows
that Mr. Conger has had his day in court with fair, accurate and
appropriate dispensation of justice and of legal standards.

For

this reason, Tel Tech respectfully requests this Court's Order
affirming the Entry of Judgment on the jury verdict.
DATED this

/ ~~ day of September, 1989.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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Richard A. Van Wagoner
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a5\rav\12804.002\rspbHef.pld

42

CERTIFICATE Ut SERVICE
Th1r i s t o c e r t i f y that on the

/ ^

day of September, ] 989,

I in 1 i iiiir rtiid corrert c o p i e s of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
« i > 1 it

mill i ni ¥\ i

(

1 1\ ; !

1 i ii:•

in

i

ji'iyi:

Colin P King
Giauque, Williams, Wixi
.r
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

t^Q

35 ,i a

12804 002

er tnia'i I

'•' .^

